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Abstract  
In this paper I present a rebuttal of Max Van Manen’s (2017) critique of interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA). Unfortunately Van Manen’s piece contains a series of 
misrepresentations of IPA and its history. Here I answer these misrepresentations and present IPA as 
subscribing, and contributing, to a broad and holistic phenomenology concerned with both pre-
reflective and reflective domains of lived experience. I contend that IPA has much to offer to our 
understanding of the experience of health and illness where participants are spontaneously and 
actively engaged in making sense of the significant and unexpected things which happen to them.  
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In his editorial for a special issue of Qualitative Health Research on phenomenology, Max Van 
Manen (2017) expresses concern at what he believes are widespread misunderstandings regarding 
the nature of phenomenological research. He then engages in a critique of interpretative 
phenomenological analysis (IPA), seemingly as one example of the misconceptions he is concerned 
with. Here I offer a rebuttal to Van Manen’s review of IPA. 
In the first part of his paper, Van Manen presents a series of ‘misconceptions of phenomenological 
inquiry and research’ (p776). The structure of his paper makes it difficult to assess whether he is 
then claiming that IPA manifests all these misconceptions or that this list represents a set of 
misunderstandings, of which IPA is guilty of a subset. Therefore I will refrain from responding to all 
of these points and concentrate instead on the section of the paper explicitly addressed at IPA. 
In this section, Van Manen expresses a concern that he sees IPA as a psychological ‘therapy oriented’ 
research methodology rather than a phenomenological approach: 
When Smith describes the participants of his research in the mid-nineties as “co-
analysts” he remains very much a therapy oriented psychologist who requests that 
his clients describe and interpret their experiences... Psychologists want their clients 
to tell and make sense of their experiences and then it is the psychologist’s 
responsibility to make sense of the sense that their clients reveal…. Smith wants to 
substitute the ordinary role of the psycho-therapist into a phenomenological 
researcher role… Psycho-therapists may be interested in encouraging their 
participants to make sense of their traumatic or major life experiences. This is what 
therapists do. But it is not what phenomenologists do. (p. 777-8) 
Unfortunately this is a considerable misrepresentation of the principles and history of IPA. I don’t 
recognise the person being described here! I am, and always have been, an academic psychologist, 
not a therapist. I am conducting research with participants, not engaging in psycho-therapy with 
clients. It is indeed the case that psychotherapists of some orientations (but by no means all) may 
engage in a process of trying to help their clients interpret their presenting problems as part of the 
therapeutic process to aid healing or enhanced well-being. But that is not what IPA is doing.  
 IPA has a conception of the person as inherently self-reflective who, when faced with difficulties or 
unexpected events, quite naturally attempts to make sense of what is happening. This sense making 
happens automatically. It is part of being human. It doesn’t need the researcher or therapist to 
engender it. I share this model of the person as a self-reflective agent with many writers within the 
human sciences (e.g. Taylor, 1985; Martin and Sugarman, 2001; Giddens, 1991). Thus the primary 
role of the researcher is: (i) to invite the participant to share this sense making; (ii) to act as a 
witness to its articulation; (iii) and then, in turn, to make sense of it. It is this which makes IPA a 
hermeneutic endeavour and aligns it with Heidegger’s conceptualization of hermeneutic 
phenomenology. 
 A final comment on Van Manen’s passage above: he picks on one phrase “co-analysts”, takes it out 
of context and amplifies it as though it is the key component of the research process. This again is 
misleading. From the beginning of IPA, the primary locus of analytic work has been the hermeneutic 
researcher interpreting the verbal material provided by the participant. It is the case that, in one 
early study, I decided to then engage in a supplementary exercise in participatory reflexive inquiry. 
For this, participants were presented with extracts from their accounts from a previous point in their 
life transition and asked to comment now on what they had said then. This then became an 
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additional component in the overall analysis. However “co-analysis” was never the primary IPA 
analytic activity and it has not been widely employed in subsequent work using IPA.  
Pursuing his theme, Van Manen presents another of his binary categorizations, claiming: 
Smith focuses on the person and on the personal experience of a participant and on 
his or her views and understandings, rather than on the phenomenon itself. (p. 778) 
IPA’s particular focus on the reflective domain puts it at odds with Van  Manen, for whom 
‘phenomenology is the study of the primal, lived, prereflective, prepredicative meaning of an 
experience’ (p. 776). 
I don’t think it is helpful to be overly prescriptive with regard to what is - or is not – 
phenomenological. Moran (2000), like many others, has pointed to the wide range of positions 
adopted by different phenomenological theorists. They share a core concern with attempting to let 
experience appear in its own terms, but there is a complex nexus of convergences and divergences 
in how they see this working. Researchers drawing on these conceptual sources to inform their 
empirical work can (and should) discuss the methodological consequences of their choices but they 
cannot lay claim to a single, definitive form of phenomenology because phenomenological 
philosophy is diverse.  
In our book on interpretative phenomenological analysis (Smith, Flowers, Larkin; 2009) (which Van 
Manen briefly refers to) we give extended treatment to a model of a fluid and graded set of 
positions adopted by participants on the pre-reflective- reflective spectrum. In the book we explicitly 
link this to Husserl’s interest in these shifting levels of reflectiveness: 
While observing, I perceive something; in a like manner I am often “busied” with 
something in memory; while quasi-observing, I follow in inventive phantasy what 
goes on in the phantasied world. Or I reflect, I draw conclusions; I take back a 
judgement, perchance “abstaining” from making any judgements at all. I am pleased 
or displeased, I am glad or sad, I wish, or I will and I do something; or, again, I 
“abstain” from being glad, from wishing, willing and doing. In all such acts I am 
present, I am actionally there. Upon reflecting, I apprehend myself as the human 
being who is there. (1982, p. 190) 
Husserl’s model is multi-layered and dynamic and is consistent with my own view of experience. 
This becomes particularly apposite when ones research question is concerned with the lived 
experience of health and illness. One can, for example, look to Sartre’s (1951) conception of what 
happens as one becomes ill where, Sartre suggests, the person’s position shifts from pre-reflective 
reception of sensations to reflective awareness of illness. Picking up on Sartre’s thinking, Toombs 
(1993) describes the shifting levels of reflective awareness which happen as the patient becomes 
engaged with the bodily sensations occurring. She summarizes: 
It is important to recognise that the meaning of illness is constituted by the patient at 
both the pre-reflective and reflective levels. The fundamental level is that of pre-
reflective sensory experience. At this level one’s immediate experience is such that it 
leads one to become aware of some disruption in the manner in which one “exists” 
one’s body… Once the immediate experience of disruption is thematised at the 
reflective level, it may be apprehended as “suffered illness”. Suffered illness is a 
synthetic totality in that it incorporates the immediate bodily sensations- the various 
and varied aches and pains- as parts of a larger whole. In particular, the unusual 
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sensations are interpreted as symptoms which point to or characterize a more 
complex entity- illness. Furthermore, at this reflective level, the disruption is 
identified and located as say “in the leg” or “in my leg”. It is important to note that 
both pre-reflective sensory experience and suffered illness represent lived experience. 
(p. 38) 
So yes of course it is important for phenomenology as a whole to include a concern with the pre-
reflective but it is also a legitimate part of phenomenological research to examine the reflective. 
This is an important part of the participants’ lived experience, especially in relation to the context 
of their interpretations of significant things happening to them. Reflective accounts make an 
important contribution to a broader and more holistic view of phenomenological research. 
Like Toombs, I would contend that, when confronted with a significant health concern, the 
originally taken for granted body may become a focus for awareness, attention and questioning. 
This natural shift to the reflective on the part of the participant means therefore that, contrary to 
Van Manen’s dualistic splitting of a focus on ‘the personal experience of a participant and on his or 
her views and understandings’ from a focus on ‘the phenomenon itself’, the participant’s reflection 
becomes part of the phenomenon itself.  
Unfortunately, Van Manen makes a number of factual errors in his description of the history of IPA, 
serving to mispresent its origins. Van Manen contends I used a number of methodological terms for 
my early work in the 1990s and that I then decided, in the mid-1990s, to change the name of my 
approach to interpretative phenomenological analysis because, according to Van Manen, ‘it is 
obvious that he was searching for a more interesting label for his work’ (p. 777). This is factually 
incorrect. I used the term interpretative phenomenological analysis for my work from the outset. If 
Van Manen had taken the trouble to read the early papers he refers to, he would see that, in most of 
them, the methodology is described as interpretative phenomenological analysis.  
As part of his account of the history of IPA, Van Manen also states, ‘in the 1990s, Jonathan Smith 
published half a dozen papers with the phrase case study in the title’ (p. 777).  Again this is a 
misrepresentation. Of the 17 papers I published in the 1990s, 3 have the term case study in the title. 
The case studies were a small part of the corpus produced and do not reflect a particular pre-
occupation, as implied by Van Manen’s claim. Further, they are not ‘case studies’ in the clinical sense; 
they are analyses of single cases. 
In the final section of his critique of IPA, Van Manen refers to my (2011) paper evaluating a part of 
the IPA corpus. In that paper I present a set of criteria for assessing IPA papers and give brief 
summaries of what I consider good exemplars. In some instances, I give short quoted extracts and 
outline why they are helping to contribute to excellent work. Of course these are just samples and 
the reader would need to read the complete study in order to appreciate the force of the analysis. 
However, his presentation suggests that Van Manen has not done this and, if this is the case, I do not 
think he is in a position to give a fair assessment of the authors or their work.  
Van Manen draws on my review paper to present a couple of quotes from one of the original studies 
and then claims that: 
Feeling alarmed and scared are psychological themes and not eidetic 
phenomenological themes. Psychological themes as cited by Smith do not get at the 
primal meanings of the experience of the VAD (Ventricular assist device). (p. 778) 
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Firstly this seems a strange categorical distinction. I would suggest that fear is a pretty fundamental 
human response and can be described as phenomenological as well as psychological. And then, 
without reading and drawing on the study in which those quotes are embedded, it is not really 
possible to make an informed evaluation of the claims or potency of a paper. And yet Van Manen 
implies this work is ‘superficial and shallow’.  
Of course it is important to judge whether work is not just consistent with a particular research 
approach but that it is also making a contribution that is significant. But I think that judgement should 
be based on a full and careful assessment of the evidence available. IPA, like any other approach, can 
be done well and can be done less well. In my opinion the best IPA is careful, insightful, surprising and 
leaves the reader feeling they have learned something important and powerful. 
One of the reasons I felt it necessary to write this response is because of the singular and prescriptive 
conclusion offered by Van Manen: 
IPA research papers that fail to provide genuine phenomenological understandings 
and insights should not be accepted for publication as phenomenological studies. An 
IPA study that is inspired by phenomenology but does not aim for phenomenological 
outcomes should be reviewed and evaluated as a psychological research study. (p. 
778) 
This is actually a complicated statement. At face value, it may seem reasonable in its apparent 
differentiation of a certain type of poor IPA paper from other potentially good IPA papers. However 
in the light of what has come earlier in the paper, the statement is troubling. The whole thrust of Van 
Manen’s argument is that, according to him, IPA is psychological and not phenomenological and, 
therefore, by definition cannot offer phenomenological outcomes.  
In my response to his paper, I have outlined a series of misrepresentations of IPA that it contains and 
pointed to what I consider unhelpful binary categorizations and prescriptive definitions of 
phenomenology. It is in this context that I find Van Manen’s above statement most problematic. Van 
Manen is setting himself up as the singular authority and arbiter. In effect he is telling journal editors 
that they should not publish IPA studies that claim to be phenomenological or that they should 
require authors to amend their papers so their claims are presented as psychological.  The problem is 
three-fold: 
1. Phenomenology is such a complex and multi-faceted entity. I don’t think any one person has 
the authority to prescribe rules about what does or does not constitute phenomenology and 
what should or should not be published. 
2. Van Manen’s misrepresentations of IPA mean that he is not in a position to offer sound 
judgement on how IPA papers should be evaluated by journal reviewers and editors. 
3. It is possible for good work to be both phenomenological and psychological. IPA is not the 
only approach which demonstrates this, but it is a particular strength of good IPA. 
It is, therefore, also important to contest the recurrent differentiation Van Manen makes in his piece 
between phenomenology and psychology as though they are two mutually exclusive constructs vying 
for the same territory. In reality these constructs are operating at different, but mutually compatible, 
levels. There are plenty of people who are both psychologists and phenomenologists, just as there 
are many people from other disciplines who are conducting phenomenological research, for 
example, in: health sciences, sports science, sociology, management, architecture, humanities, and 
pedagogy. When doing their work, therefore, these researchers are being, at one and the same time, 
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both phenomenological and sociological or both phenomenological and architectural or both 
phenomenological and musical etc. 
In concluding, I would like to say that I wish I did not have to write this piece. I had considered Max 
Van Manen as engaged in the same broad academic endeavour as myself. However I felt it necessary 
to respond in order to rebuff the misleading claims made by him in his paper. The human science 
project, and phenomenological research as a central part of that, is of crucial importance. However it 
is also fragile and precarious. It concerns and saddens me, therefore, when misleading 
characterizations are presented, prescriptive judgements and categorical differences are invoked, 
and individuals become embroiled in disputes. I would hope we can move toward a position where 
we can, at one and the same time, celebrate connectivity and communality and can also respect and 
work with difference. 
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